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Abstract—Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) are difficult to
detect due to their “low-and-slow” attack patterns and frequent
use of zero-day exploits. We present UNICORN, an anomaly-
based APT detector that effectively leverages data provenance
analysis. From modeling to detection, UNICORN tailors its design
specifically for the unique characteristics of APTs. Through
extensive yet time-efficient graph analysis, UNICORN explores
provenance graphs that provide rich contextual and historical
information to identify stealthy anomalous activities without pre-
defined attack signatures. Using a graph sketching technique, it
summarizes long-running system execution with space efficiency
to combat slow-acting attacks that take place over a long time
span. UNICORN further improves its detection capability using a
novel modeling approach to understand long-term behavior as the
system evolves. Our evaluation shows that UNICORN outperforms
an existing state-of-the-art APT detection system and detects real-
life APT scenarios with high accuracy.
I. INTRODUCTION
Advanced Persistent Threats (APT) are becoming increas-
ingly common [9]. The long timescale over which such attacks
take place makes them fundamentally different from more
conventional attacks. In an APT, the adversary’s goal is to gain
control of a specific (network of) system(s) while remaining
undetected for an extended period of time [116]. The adversary
often relies on zero-day exploits [96], [116] to gain a foothold
in the victim system.
Traditional detection systems are not well-suited to APTs.
Detectors dependent on malware signatures are blind to attacks
that exploit new vulnerabilities [20]. Anomaly-based systems
typically analyze series of system calls [114] and log-adjacent
system events [130], but most of them [36], [81], [92], [109]
have difficulty modeling long-term behavior patterns. Further,
they are susceptible to evasion techniques, because they typi-
cally inspect only short sequences of system calls and events.
As a result, they have exhibited little success in detecting
APTs. Systems that attempt to capture long-term program
behavior [112] limit their analysis to event co-occurrence to
avoid high computational and memory overheads.
More recent work [15], [19], [83], [87] suggests that data
provenance might be a better data source for APT detection.
Data provenance represents system execution as a directed
acyclic graph (DAG) that describes information flow between
system subjects (e.g., processes) and objects (e.g., files and
sockets). It connects causally-related events in the graph, even
when those events are separated by a long time period. Thus,
even though systems under APT attack usually behave simi-
larly to unattacked systems, the richer contextual information
in provenance allows for better separation of benign and
malicious events [55].
However, leveraging data provenance to perform runtime
APT analysis is difficult. Provenance graph analysis is com-
putationally demanding, because the graph size grows con-
tinuously as APTs slowly penetrate a system. The neces-
sary contextual analysis, which requires large graph compo-
nents, makes the task even more challenging. One approach
to provenance-based APT detection [87] uses simple edge-
matching rules based on prior attack knowledge, but this makes
it difficult to detect new classes of APTs [15]. Provenance-
based anomaly detection systems rely on graph neighbor-
hood exploration to understand normal behavior through ei-
ther static [53] or dynamic [83] models. However, practical
computational constraints limit the scope of the contextual
analysis that is feasible. Thus, current systems suffer from
some combination of the following three problems: 1) static
models cannot capture long term system behavior, 2) the low-
and-slow APT approach can gradually poison dynamic models,
and 3) approaches that require in-memory computation [83],
[87] scale poorly in the presence of long-running attacks [87].
We introduce UNICORN, a provenance-based anomaly de-
tector capable of detecting APTs. UNICORN uses graph sketch-
ing to build an incrementally updatable, fixed size, longitudinal
graph data structure 1 that enables efficient computation of
graph statistics [33]. This longitudinal nature of the structure
permits extensive graph exploration, which allows UNICORN
1An algorithm that builds a graph data structure is called a graph kernel,
which is an overloaded term that also refers to functions that compare the
similarity between two graphs. We adopt the second definition here.
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to track stealthy intrusions. The fixed size and incrementally
updatable graph data structure obviates the need for an in-
memory representation of the provenance graph, so UNICORN
is scalable with low computational and storage overheads. It
can succinctly track a machine’s entire provenance history
from boot to shutdown. UNICORN directly models a system’s
evolving behavior during training, but it does not update
models afterward, preventing an attacker from poisoning the
model.
We make the following contributions:
• We present a provenance-based anomaly detection system
tailored to APT attacks.
• We introduce a novel sketch-based, time-weighted prove-
nance encoding that is compact and able to usefully sum-
marize provenance graphs over long time periods.
• We evaluate UNICORN against both simulated and real-
life APT attack scenarios. We show that UNICORN can
detect APT campaigns with high accuracy. Compared to
previous work, UNICORN significantly improves precision
and accuracy by 24% and 30%, respectively.
• We provide an open source implementation.
II. BACKGROUND
Traditional anomaly-based intrusion detection systems
(IDS) analyze system call traces from audit systems [37],
[81], [130], [134]. However, for APT detection, whole-system
provenance [100] is a superior data source.
A. Challenges of Syscall Traces
The system call abstraction provides a simple interface by
which user-level applications request services of the operating
system. As the mechanism through which system services are
invoked, the system call interface is also generally the entry
point for attackers trying to subvert a system [61]. Therefore,
system call traces have long been regarded as the de facto
information source for intrusion detection [37].
However, existing systems capture unstructured collections
of syscall audit logs, requiring analysis to make sense of
such information. Given the low-and-slow nature of APTs,
analyzing individual syscall logs to detect point-wise outliers
is often fruitless [23], as is inspection of short system call
sequences. Such analysis does not reflect the historical context
of each syscall event, resulting in high false positive rates
and mimicry attacks that evade detection [98], [123]. In con-
trast, data provenance encodes historical context into causality
graphs [21].
Data provenance can be used to model a variety of event
sequences in computing, including syscall audit logs. Indeed,
there exist frameworks that reconstruct provenance graph
structures from audit data streams to allow for better rea-
soning about system execution [44]. However, such post-hoc
approaches make it difficult to ensure graph correctness [104];
it is difficult to prove completeness, trustworthiness, or re-
liability of the syscall traces from which the graph is built,
because many syscall interposition techniques suffer from
concurrency issues [43], [125]. It is easy to bypass library-
wrapper-based syscall capture mechanisms [63], while user-
space mechanisms (e.g., ptrace) incur unacceptable runtime
performance overheads [43] and are susceptible to race condi-
tions [63]. The same race condition issues also plague in-kernel
mechanisms (e.g., Systrace [105], Janus [46]), resulting
in time-of-check-to-time-of-use (TOCTTOU), time-of-audit-
to-time-of-use (TOATTOU), and time-of-replacement-to-time-
of-use (TORTTOU) bugs [125]. For example, many IDS [81],
[130] analyze syscalls and their arguments to defend against
mimicry attacks, but TOATTOU bugs cause the captured
syscall arguments to be different from the true values accessed
in the kernel [43]. Perhaps more importantly, instead of a
single graph of system execution, syscall-based provenance
frameworks produce many disconnected graphs, because they
cannot trace the interrelationships of kernel threads that do
not make use of the syscall interface. Consequently, such
frameworks can rarely detect the stealthy malicious events
found in APTs.
B. Whole-System Provenance
Whole-system provenance collection runs at the operating
system level, capturing all system activities and the interactions
between them [104]. OS-level provenance systems such as
Hi-Fi [104], LPM [16], and CamFlow [100] provide strong
security and completeness guarantees with respect to informa-
tion flow capture. This completeness is particularly desirable in
APT scenarios as it captures long-distance causal relationships
enabling contextualized analysis, even if a malicious agent ma-
nipulates security-sensitive kernel objects to hide its presence.
We use CamFlow [100] as the reference implementation
throughout the paper, although there exist other whole-system
provenance implementations; in § VI, we show that UNI-
CORN works seamlessly with other capture mechanisms as
well. CamFlow adopts the Linux Security Modules (LSM)
framework [89] to ensure high-quality, reliable recording of
information flows among data objects [45], [101]. LSM elim-
inates race conditions (e.g., TOCTTOU attacks) by placing
mediation points inside the kernel instead of at the system call
interface [61].
C. Summary and Problem Statement
Prior research [15], [83], [87] explored the use of data
provenance for APT detection. However, these approaches all
suffer from some combinations of the following limitations:
L1 : Pre-defined edge-matching rules are overly sensitive and
make it difficult to detect zero-day exploits common in
APTs [87].
L2 : Constrained provenance graph exploration provides only
limited understanding of information context critical to de-
tect low-profile anomalies. For example, graph exploration
is limited to small graph neighborhoods, single node/edge
attributes, and truncated subgraphs [15], [53], [83].
L3 : System behavior models fail to cater to the unique character-
istics of APT attacks. Static models cannot capture dynamic
behavior of long-running systems [53], while dynamic mod-
eling during runtime risks poisoning from the attackers [83].
L4 : Provenance graphs are stored and analyzed only in memory,
sacrificing long-term scalability [83], [87].
UNICORN addresses those issues. We formalize the system-
wide intrusion detection problem in APT campaigns as a
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real-time graph-based anomaly detection problem on large,
attributed, streaming whole-system provenance graphs. At any
point in time, the entirety of a provenance graph, captured
from system boot to its current state is compared against a
behavior model consisting of known good provenance graphs.
The system is considered under attack if its provenance graph
deviates significantly from the model. For APT detection, an
ideal provenance-based IDS must:
• Continuously analyze provenance graphs with space and
time efficiency while taking full advantage of rich informa-
tion content provided by whole-system provenance graphs;
• Take into consideration the entire duration of system exe-
cution without making assumptions of attack behavior;
• Learn only normal system behavior changes but not those
directed by the attackers.
III. THREAT MODEL
We assume APT scenarios for host intrusion detection: an
attacker illegitimately gains access to a system and plans to
remain there for an extended period of time without being
detected. The attacker may conduct the attack in several phases
and use a variety of techniques during each phase [131]. The
goal of UNICORN is to detect such attacks at any stage by
interpreting the provenance generated by the host. We assume
that, prior to the attack, UNICORN thoroughly observes the
host system during normal operation and that no attacks arise
during this initial modeling period.
The integrity of the data collection framework is central
to UNICORN’s correctness. We assume that Linux Security
Modules [89], which is the Linux reference monitor implemen-
tation, correctly provides reference monitor guarantees [10] for
CamFlow [100]. Specifically, we assume that LSM integrity is
provided via an attested boot sequence [16]. We make similar
integrity assumptions for other data collection frameworks.
UNICORN can further safeguard its data source by streaming
it across the network. While we primarily envision UNICORN
as an endpoint security monitor, UNICORN’s ability to stream
provenance data enables off-host intrusion detectors that are
not co-located with a potentially compromised machine.
For the remainder of the paper, we assume the correctness
of the kernel, the provenance data, and the analysis engine.
We instead focus on UNICORN’s analytic capabilities.
IV. DESIGN
UNICORN is a host-based intrusion detection system capa-
ble of simultaneously detecting intrusions on a collection of
networked hosts. We begin with a brief overview of UNICORN
and then follow with a detailed discussion of each system com-
ponent in the following sections. Fig. 1 illustrates UNICORN’s
general pipeline.
1 Takes as input a labeled, streaming provenance graph.
UNICORN accepts a stream of attributed edges produced by
a provenance capture system running on one or more net-
worked hosts. Provenance systems construct a single, whole-
system provenance DAG with a partial-order guarantee, which
allows for efficient streaming computation (§ IV-B) and fully
contextualized analysis (L2 ). We present UNICORN using
CamFlow [100], although it can obtain provenance from other
1 2 3 4
Fig. 1: UNICORN 1 takes a streaming provenance graph, 2 periodically
summarizes graph features into histograms, and then 3 creates fixed-size
graph sketches. The resulting clustering-based model 4 captures the dynamics
of system execution. During deployment, graph sketches are created through
the same steps ( 1 , 2 and 3 ) and then compared against the model in 4 .
systems, such as LPM [16] and Spade [44], the latter of which
interoperates with commodity audit systems such as Linux
Audit and Windows ETW.
2 Builds at runtime an in-memory histogram. UNICORN
efficiently constructs a streaming graph histogram that rep-
resents the entire history of system execution, updating the
counts of histogram elements as new edges arrive in the
graph data stream. By iteratively exploring larger graph neigh-
borhoods, it discovers causal relationships between system
entities providing execution context. This is UNICORN’s first
step in building an efficient data structure that facilitates
contextualized graph analysis (L2 ). Specifically, each element
in the histogram describes a unique substructure of the graph,
taking into consideration the heterogeneous label(s) attached
to the vertices and edges within the substructure, as well as
the temporal order of those edges.
To adapt to expected behavioral changes during the course
of normal system execution, UNICORN periodically discounts
the influence of histogram elements that have no causal
relationships with recent events (L3 ). Slowly “forgetting”
irrelevant past events allows us to effectively model meta-
states (§ IV-D) throughout system uptime (e.g., system boot,
initialization, serving requests, failure modes, etc.). However,
it does not mean that UNICORN forgets informative execution
history; rather, UNICORN uses information flow dependencies
in the graph to keep up-to-date important, relevant context
information. Attackers can slowly penetrate the victim system
in an APT, hoping that a time-based IDS eventually forgets
this initial attack, but they cannot break the information flow
dependencies that are essential to the success of the attack [87].
3 Periodically, computes a fixed-size graph sketch. In a
pure streaming environment, the number of unique histogram
elements can grow arbitrarily large as UNICORN summarizes
the entire provenance graph. This variation in size makes
it challenging to efficiently compute similarity between two
histograms and impractical to design algorithms for later
modeling and detection. UNICORN employs a similarity-
preserving hashing technique [132] to transform the histogram
to a graph sketch [7]. The graph sketch is incrementally
maintainable, meaning that UNICORN does not need to keep
the entire provenance graph in memory; its size is constant
(L4 ). Additionally, graph sketches preserve normalized Jaccard
similarity [64] between two graph histograms. This distance-
preserving property is particularly important to the clustering
3
algorithm in our later analysis, which is based on the same
graph similarity metric.
4 Clusters sketches into a model. UNICORN builds a normal
system execution model and identifies abnormal activities
without attack knowledge (L1 ). However, unlike traditional
clustering approaches, UNICORN takes advantage of its stream-
ing capability to generate models that are evolutionary. The
model captures behavioral changes within a single execution
by clustering system activities at various stages of its exe-
cution, but UNICORN does not modify models dynamically
during runtime when the attacker may be subverting the system
(L3 ). It is therefore more suitable for long-running systems
under potential APT attacks.
A. Provenance Graph
Provenance graphs are increasingly popular for attack anal-
ysis [15], [40], [79], [102] and are attractive for APT detection.
In particular, provenance graphs capture causality relationships
between events. Causal connectivity facilitates reasoning over
events that are temporally distant, thus useful in navigating
through APT’s low-and-slow attack pattern. Audit log analysis
frequently relies on temporal relationships, while provenance
analysis leverages causality relationships, producing a more
meaningful model of system behavior.
UNICORN compares two system executions based on the
similarity between their corresponding provenance graphs.
UNICORN always considers the entire provenance graph to
detect long-running attacks. There exist many graph similarity
measures, but many approaches (e.g., graph isomorphism)
are too restrictive (i.e., require two graphs to be exactly
or largely identical) [110], because even normal executions
often produce slightly different provenance graphs. Whole-
system provenance graphs can grow large quickly [100], so
NP-complete [42], [95] and even polynomial algorithms [71],
[122] are too computationally expensive for streaming settings.
As we show in the following sections, UNICORN’s graph
similarity algorithm does not exhibit these problems.
B. Constructing Graph Histograms
Our goal is to efficiently compare provenance graphs while
tolerating minor variations in normal executions. The two
criteria we have for an algorithm are: 1) the representation
should take into account long-term causal relationships, and
2) we must be able to implement the algorithm on the real-
time streaming graph data so that we can thwart intrusions
when they happen (not merely detect them).
We adapt a linear-time, fast Weisfeiler-Lehman (WL) sub-
tree graph kernel algorithm based on one dimensional WL
test of isomorphism [126]. The WL test of isomorphism
and its subtree kernel variation [110] are known for their
discriminative power for a broad class of graphs, beyond many
state-of-the-art graph learning algorithms (e.g., graph neural
networks [52], [129]).
Our use of the WL subtree graph kernel hinges on our
ability to construct a histogram of vertices that captures
the graph structure surrounding each vertex. We bin vertices
according to augmented vertex labels that describe fully the R-
hop neighborhood of the vertex. We construct these augmented
vertex labels by iterative label propagation; we provide an
intuitive description here and a more formal one below. For
simplicity of exposition, assume we have an entire static graph.
A single relabeling step takes as input a vertex label, the
labels of all its incoming edges, and the labels of the source
vertices of all those edges. It then outputs a new label for the
vertex representing the aggregation of all the input labels. We
repeat this process for every vertex, and then repeat the entire
procedure R times to construct labels describing an R-hop
neighborhood. Once we have constructed augmented vertex
labels for every vertex in the graph, we create a histogram
whose buckets correspond to these labels. The WL test of
isomorphism compares two graphs based on these augmented
vertex labels; two graphs are similar if they have similar
distributions across similar sets of labels.
Algorithm 1: Graph Histogram Generation
Input : G = (V,E,Fv,Fe, C), R
Output: Histogram H
1 for i← 1 to R do
2 foreach v ∈ V do
3 M ← {}
4 if i == 1 then
5 l0(v)← Fv(v)
6 else if i == 2 then
7 TS ← {}
8 foreach e ∈ In(v) do
9 w ← Source(e)
10 M ←M + {Fe(e) :: l1(w)}
11 T(w) ← C(e)
12 TS ← TS + {T(w)}
13 T(v) ← Min(TS)
14 else
15 TS ← {}
16 foreach w ∈ N(v) do
17 M ←M + {li−1(w)}
18 TS ← TS + {T(w)}
19 T(w) ← Min(TS)
20 Sort(M) based on timestamps T(w), ∀w whose label is
included in M
21 sv ← li−1(v) + Concat(M)
22 foreach v ∈ V do
23 li(v) ← Hash(sv)
24 if li(v) /∈ H then H[li(v)]← 1
25 else H[li(v)]← H[li(v)] + 1
Alg. 1 presents the algorithm more formally. We define
a static graph G as a 5-tuple (V,E,Fv,Fe, C), where V
is the set of vertices, E is the set of directed edges, i.e.,
e = (u, v) ∈ E and (u, v) 6= (v, u) ∀ u, v ∈ V . Fv : V → Σ is
a function that assigns labels from an alphabet Σ to each vertex
in the graph, and similarly, Fe : E → Ψ assigns labels from
an alphabet Ψ to each edge. C is a function that records the
timestamp of each edge. In line 1, R is the number of neigh-
borhood hops that each vertex explores to generate histogram
elements. UNICORN creates a histogram representation of an
entire graph by examining rooted subtrees around every vertex
in the graph. By considering such non-linear substructures,
in addition to the attributes of each vertex/edge, UNICORN
preserves structural equivalence of provenance graphs, which
has been demonstrated to outperform linear approaches such
as random walk [94]. M is a list of neighboring vertex and/or
edge labels of a vertex v and li(v) is the label (i.e., histogram
element) of the vertex v in the ith iteration (or the (i − 1)-
hop neighborhood, where the 0-hop neighborhood is the vertex
itself). TS is a list of timestamps of the neighboring vertices.
In line 8, the function In(v) returns all the incoming edges of
the vertex v and the function Source(e) in line 9 returns the
source vertex of the edge e. T records the timestamp of each
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Fig. 2: A simple, abstracted provenance graph where dotted edges arrive after
all solid edges have been processed and dotted vertices are newly-arrived. If
the provenance graph observes partial ordering, edge 1 must arrive before
edge 2 and only the local structures of vertex E and F need to be computed.
However, in a provenance graph where partial ordering is not observed, we
can encounter edge 3 and 4 and the newly-arrived vertex G (in dotted red)
after the solid edges. In such a case, with R = 2, we need to update both
vertex C and E (descendants of D) for edge 3 and vertex C, D, and E
(descendants of G) for edge 4.
vertex v. In line 16, N (v) = {w | (w, v) ∈ E} is the set of
vertices to which v is connected by an in-coming edge.
Our goal is to construct histograms where each element
of the histogram corresponds to a unique vertex label, which
captures the vertex’s R-step in-coming neighborhood. Labels
capture information about the edges in the neighborhood and
the identities of the vertices in that neighborhood, including
complex contextual information that reveals causal relation-
ships among objects, subjects, and activities [94]. We bootstrap
the labels as follows: each vertex begins with its own initial
label. We then incorporate 1-hop neighbors by adding the
labels of the incoming edges and the initial vertex labels of the
sources of those edges. After this bootstrapping process, every
vertex label now represents both vertex and edge labels so that
as we expand to increasingly large neighborhoods, we need
only add labels for the sources of all the incoming edges (since
those labels already incorporate edge labels from their incom-
ing edges). We sort all the labels by the timestamp of their
corresponding edge, respecting the sequence of events in the
system, and then hash the label list to facilitate fast lookup and
bookkeeping. Some vertices/edges may have multiple labels,
but the same hashing trick permits multi-label computation at
negligible cost.
Streaming Variant and Complexity. In a streaming envi-
ronment, we run Alg. 1 only on newly-arriving vertices and
on vertices whose in-coming neighborhood is affected by
new edges. In provenance graphs that use multiple vertices
per provenance entity or activity to represent different ver-
sions or states of the corresponding object [90], we need
to compute/update only the neighborhood of the destination
vertex for each new edge, because all incoming edges to a
vertex arrive before any outgoing ones [101]. UNICORN takes
advantage of this partial ordering to minimize computation
(Fig. 2), which is particularly important during exploration
of large neighborhoods. Our implementation (§ VI) further
reduces computation using batch processing. Consequently,
the practical runtime complexity of the streaming variant of
Alg. 1 is approximately equivalent to that of the original 1-
dimensional Weisfeiler-Lehman algorithm [110]: using R-hop
neighborhoods, the complexity is O(R|E|).
Discounting Histogram Elements for Concept Drift. In APT
scenarios, the long duration of a potential attack suggests that
a good model must include the system’s long-term behavior.
However, system behavior often changes over time, which
results in changes in the underlying statistical properties of
the streaming provenance graph. This phenomenon is referred
to as concept drift [120].
UNICORN accounts for such changes in system behavior
through the use of exponential weight decay [70] on histogram
element counts to gradually forget outdated data. It assigns
weights that are inversely proportional to the age of the
data [73]. For each element h in the histogram H , as a new
data item xt (i.e., a hashed label li(v) from Alg. 1 line 23)
streams in at time t, instead of counting Hh as:
Hh =
∑
t
1xt=h
UNICORN discounts the influence of existing data accord-
ing to their age:
Lh =
∑
t
wt1xt=h
where 1cond is an indicator function that returns 1 when
cond is true and 0 otherwise, and wt = e−λ∆t. UNICORN
increments t monotonically with the number of edges added
to the graph. We use L instead of H to denote weighted
histograms (Table X).
Applicability in Intrusion Detection Scenarios. The gradu-
ally forgetting approach helps UNICORN focus on the current
dynamics of system execution (i.e., the most recent part of
the provenance graph), as well as any parts of the graph that
are causally related to the current execution (based on the
path length), while maintaining fading “memory” of the past,
the rate of which is controlled by the weight decay factor λ.
Notably, regardless of how temporally distant an event has
occurred from the current state of system execution, if it is
causally related to a current object/activity, that event and
its surrounding neighborhood will contribute to the histogram
without discount. Therefore, provenance graphs ensure that
relevant contextual information remains in the analysis regard-
less of time. In § IV-D, we discuss how UNICORN models a
system’s evolutionary behavior.
C. Generating Graph Sketches
The graph histogram is a simple vector space graph statistic
that describes system execution. However, unlike traditional
histogram-based similarity analysis [13], [24], [133], UNI-
CORN constantly updates the histogram as new edges arrive.
Measuring the similarity between streaming histograms is
challenging, because the number of histogram elements is
not known a priori and changes continuously. Moreover, we
should measure the similarity based on the underlying distri-
bution of graph features, instead of absolute counts. However,
most existing machine learning [31], [57] and data mining [34],
[54] techniques applicable to modeling system behavior from
graph histograms require fixed-length numerical vectors.
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One naive solution is to enumerate all possible histogram
elements beforehand, e.g., through combinatorial enumeration
and manual feature engineering. However, given a potentially
large number of vertex and edge labels, exacerbated by the
multi-label nature of the graph and a possibly large number of
neighborhood iterations, the resulting histogram will be sparse
and thus problematic in terms of space and time complexity.
Alternatively, manual feature engineering might reduce the
size of the histogram, but it is time-consuming and inevitably
requires arbitrary handling of unseen histogram elements.
We instead use locality sensitive hashing [59], also called
similarity-preserving data sketching [124], which is commonly
used in classifying [5] and filtering [12] high-cardinality data
streams. UNICORN employs HistoSketch [132], an approach
based on consistent weighted sampling [82], that efficiently
maintains compact and fixed-size sketches for streaming his-
tograms. HistoSketch is a constant time algorithm, so it is
fast enough to support real-time streaming analysis on rapidly
growing provenance graphs. It also unbiasedly approximates
histograms based on their normalized, generalized min-max
(Jaccard) similarity [128]. Jaccard similarity [27] has been
successfully applied in a variety of machine-learning-based
real-world problems, such as document analysis [111] and
malware classification [107] and detection [32]. We review
HistoSketch in Appendix § B. For proof of correctness of the
algorithm, we refer interested readers to the original work by
Yang et al. [132].
D. Learning Evolutionary Models
Given graph sketches and a similarity metric, clustering is
a common data mining approach to identify outliers. However,
conventional clustering approaches fail to capture a system’s
evolutionary behavior [8]. APT scenarios are sufficiently long
term that failing to capture this behavior leads to too many false
positives [83]. UNICORN leverages its streaming capability
to create evolutionary models that capture normal changes
in system behavior. Crucially, it builds these evolutionary
models during training, not during deployment. Systems that
dynamically evolve models during deployment risk poisoning
their models during an APT’s drawn out attack phase [83].
UNICORN creates a series of temporally-ordered sketches
during training. It then clusters this sketch sequence from a
single server using the well-known K-medoids algorithm [65],
using the silhouette coefficient to determine the optimal value
of K [108]. The clusters represent “meta-states” of system
execution, e.g., startup, initialization, steady state behavior.
UNICORN then uses both the temporal ordering of the sketches
in all clusters and the statistics of each cluster (e.g., diame-
ter, medoid) to produce a model of the system’s evolution.
Alg. 2 describes the construction of the evolutionary model.
Each sketch S(t) belongs to a single cluster indexed k. The
evolution E is an ordered list of cluster indices, whose order
is determined by the temporally-ordered sketches S(t).
For each training instance, UNICORN creates a model that
captures the changes of system execution states during its
runtime. Intuitively, this is similar to an automaton [62], [109]
that tracks the state of system execution. The final model
consists of many sub-models from all the provenance graphs
in the training data. With evolutionary modeling, UNICORN
Algorithm 2: Generating an Evolution Trace
Input : Sketches S(t), t = 0, · · · , T of a streaming provenance graph,
ordered by time t
Output: Evolution List E
1 E = {}
2 for t← 0 to T do
3 k = BelongsTo(S(t))
4 /* k ∈ {1, · · · , K} */
5 if Empty(E) || Tail(E) != k then E = E :: k
learns system behavior at many points in time; with the
gradually forgetting scheme (§ IV-B), at any point in time,
UNICORN is able to focus on the most relevant activities.
E. Detecting Anomalies
During deployment, anomaly detection follows the same
streaming paradigm described in previous sections. UNICORN
periodically creates graph sketches as the histogram evolves
from the streaming provenance graph. Given a graph sketch,
UNICORN compares the sketch to all the sub-models learned
during modeling, fitting it to a cluster in each sub-model.
UNICORN assumes that monitoring starts from system boot
and tracks system state transitions within each sub-model. To
be considered valid in any sub-model, a sketch must either
fit into the current state or (one of) the next state(s) (i.e., in
the cases where the sketch captures state transition in system
execution); otherwise, it is considered anomalous. Thus, we
detect two forms of anomalous behavior: sketches that do
not fit into existing clusters and invalid transitions between
clusters.
V. IMPLEMENTATION
We use the vertex-centric graph processing framework,
GraphChi [75] to implement UNICORN’s graph processing al-
gorithms in C++; we implement its data parsing and modeling
components in Python.
GraphChi [75] is a disk-based system that efficiently com-
putes on large graphs with billions of edges on a single com-
puter. Using GraphChi, UNICORN achieves efficient analysis
performance without needing to store the entire provenance
graph in memory. UNICORN relies on two important features
of GraphChi:
1) GraphChi uses a Parallel Sliding Windows (PSW) algorithm
to split the graph into shards, with approximately the same
number of edges in each shard; it computes on each shard in
parallel. The algorithm allows fast vertex and edge updates to
disk with only a small number of non-sequential disk accesses.
This allows UNICORN to analyze the whole provenance graph
independent of memory constraints.
2) UNICORN leverages GraphChi’s efficient computation on
streaming graphs. Per edge updates are efficient in their use of
I/O, and selective scheduling reduces computation. UNICORN’s
guaranteed partial ordering (§ IV-B) minimizes the number of
vertices it visits even when the neighborhood hop parameter,
R, is large. Batching edge additions, rather than processing
one edge at a time, makes processing even faster.
Appendix § A provides details on obtaining and testing our
open-source implementation.
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VI. EVALUATION
We analyzed approximately 1.5 TB of system monitoring
data containing approximately 2 billion OS-level provenance
records from various tracing systems, demonstrating the ap-
plicability of our approach. Our evaluation addresses the
following research questions:
Q1. Can UNICORN accurately detect anomalies in long-
running systems under APT attacks? (§ VI-A, § VI-B, § VI-C)
Q2. How important are the design decisions we made that are
tailored to the characteristics of APTs? (§ VI-C)
Q3. Does UNICORN’s gradually forgetting scheme improve
understanding of system behavior? (§ VI-C)
Q4. How effective are UNICORN’s evolutionary models com-
pared to existing clustering-based approaches that use static
snapshots? (§ VI-A)
Q5. Is UNICORN fast enough to perform realtime monitoring
and detection without falling behind? (§ VI-E)
Q6. What are UNICORN’s memory and CPU utilization during
system execution? (§ VI-F)
We compare UNICORN to StreamSpot, a state-of-the-art
anomaly detector that has shown promising results for APT
attacks. We show that multiple factors lead to UNICORN’s
higher detection accuracy; both its multi-hop graph exploration
(Q2) and the evolutionary modeling scheme (Q4) are better
suited for provenance-based APT detection.
We then explore the efficacy of UNICORN with three real-
life APT attack datasets, all of which were captured during
a red-team vs. blue-team adversarial engagement organized
by U.S. DARPA and are publicly available [66]. We separate
DARPA’s datasets based on the underlying provenance capture
systems (i.e., Cadets, ClearScope, and THEIA). We show
that UNICORN can detect system anomalies during real APT
campaigns (Q1).
Lastly, we create our own simulated APT supply-chain
attack datasets (SC-1 and SC-2) using CamFlow in a controlled
lab environment to demonstrate that UNICORN is performant
in terms of processing speed (Q5) and CPU and memory effi-
ciency (Q6). We show that it is capable of detecting simulated
APT attacks using evolutionary modeling (Q4) with diverse
normal and background activities. We further demonstrate that
detection capability can be improved with contextualized graph
exploration (Q2), and that the gradually forgetting scheme
improves detection accuracy, because it helps better understand
system behavior (Q3).
Properly evaluating and benchmarking security systems is
difficult. We adhere to the guidelines proposed by Kouwe
et al. [121] to the best of our ability. For example, the
testbed that we designed to create the SC datasets ensures
proper documentation of experiment specifications and easy
reproduction of evaluation data and results. We also use 5-fold
cross-validation to provide a more accurate evaluation [78].
A. UNICORN vs. State-of-the-Art
StreamSpot [83] is a clustering-based anomaly detection
system that processes streaming heterogeneous graphs. It ex-
tracts local graph features from single node/edge labels through
breadth-first traversal on each graph node and vectorizes them
for classification. StreamSpot models only a single snapshot
of every training graph and dynamically maintains its clusters
during test time by updating the parameters of the clusters.
Experiment Dataset # of Graphs Avg. |V| Avg. |E| Preprocessed Data Size (GiB)
StreamSpot
YouTube 100 8,292 113,229 0.3
Gmail 100 6,827 37,382 0.1
Download 100 8,831 310,814 1
VGame 100 8,637 112,958 0.4
CNN 100 8,990 294,903 0.9
Attack 100 8,891 28,423 0.1
TABLE I: Characteristics of the StreamSpot dataset. The dataset is publicly
available only in a preprocessed format.
Experimental Dataset. The StreamSpot dataset contains in-
formation flow graphs derived from six scenarios, five of which
are benign [84]. Each scenario runs 100 times, producing
100 graphs for each. Using the Linux SystemTap logging
system [60], the benign scenarios record system calls from
normal browsing activities, such as watching YouTube videos
and checking Gmail, while the attack scenarios involve a
drive-by download from a malicious URL that exploits a
Flash vulnerability and gains root access to the visiting host.
The original scripts and the precise attack are unknown to
us, however, the datasets are publicly available [84], and we
confirmed with the authors that the information flow graphs
were constructed from all system calls on a machine from the
start of a task until its termination. Table I summarizes the
dataset.
We use this dataset to fairly compare UNICORN with
StreamSpot. These nicely isolated scenarios may not represent
today’s typical workloads. However, they provide insight into
how the different systems perform relative to each other.
Furthermore, we might also interpret them as a proxy for the
design pattern of today’s microservice architecture [93]. As
we will see next, UNICORN performs particularly well in such
scenarios, but it is also capable of accurately detecting anoma-
lies in more diverse, heterogeneous computing environments
(§ VI-B and § VI-C). We discuss this point further in § VII.
Experiment Precision Recall Accuracy F-Score
StreamSpot (baseline) 0.74 N/A 0.66 N/A
R = 1 0.51 1.0 0.60 0.68
R = 3 0.98 0.93 0.96 0.94
TABLE II: Comparison to StreamSpot on the StreamSpot dataset. We estimate
StreamSpot’s average accuracy and precision from the figure included in the
paper [83], which does not report exact values. They did not report recall or
F-score.
Experimental Results. We compare UNICORN to StreamSpot,
using StreamSpot’s own dataset. We configure UNICORN to
use a sketch size |S| = 2000 and examine with different
neighborhood sizes, R = 1 (equivalent to StreamSpot) and
R = 3. As shown in Table II, UNICORN’s ability to trivially
consider larger neighborhoods (R = 3) produces significant
Experiment # of Test Graphs # of FPs (R = 1) # of FPs (R = 3)
YouTube 25 14 0
Gmail 25 19 0
Download 25 25 2
VGame 25 20 0
CNN 25 18 0
TABLE III: Decomposition of UNICORN’s false positive results of the
StreamSpot dataset.
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precision/accuracy improvement. The detailed precision results
in Table III further show that analyzing larger neighbor-
hoods greatly reduces the false positive rate. This supports
our hypothesis that contextual analysis is crucial. UNICORN
raises false positive alarms only on the Download dataset,
the most diverse dataset of StreamSpot’s benign datasets (also
manifested in its large average number of edges in Table I).
We discuss the importance of graph exploration in more depth
in § VI-C.
The following sections evaluate UNICORN on various real-
life and simulated APT attacks. Unfortunately, we were unable
to evaluate StreamSpot on these datasets, because it could not
handle the large number of edge types present nor could it
scale to the size of the graphs.
B. DARPA TC Datasets
Next, we demonstrate that UNICORN can effectively detect
APTs utilizing data from a variety of different provenance
capture systems.
DARPA’s Transparent Computing program focuses on de-
veloping technologies and prototype systems to provide both
forensic and detection of APTs.
Experiment Dataset # of Graphs Avg. |V| Avg. |E| Raw Data Size (GiB)
DARPA
CADETS
Benign 66 59,983 4,811,836 271
Attack 8 386,548 5,160,963 38
DARPA
ClearScope
Benign 43 2,309 4,199,309 441
Attack 51 11,769 4,273,003 432
DARPA
THEIA
Benign 2 19,461 1,913,202 4
Attack 25 275,822 4,073,621 85
TABLE IV: Characteristics of graph datasets used in the DARPA experiments.
Experimental Datasets. The DARPA datasets (Table IV) were
collected from a network of hosts during the 2-week long third
adversarial engagement of the DARPA Transparent Computing
program. The engagement involved various teams responsible
for collecting audit data from different platforms (e.g., Linux,
Windows, BSD), launching attacks during the engagement
period, and analyzing the data to detect attacks and perform
forensic analysis. The red team that carried out attacks also
generated benign background activity (e.g., web browsing),
thus allowing us to model normal system behavior.
The CADETS dataset was captured via the Causal,
Adaptive, Distributed, and Efficient Tracing System
(CADETS) on FreeBSD [1]. ClearScope instruments the
entire Android mobile software stack to capture provenance
of the operations of mobile devices [3]. THEIA is a system
for tagging and tracking multi-level host events [35]; it
instruments Ubuntu Linux machines during the engagement.
The experiment simulated an enterprise setup [87] includ-
ing security-critical services such as a web server, an SSH
server, an Email server, and an SMB server (for shared file
access). The red team carried out various nation-state and
common threats through the use of, e.g., a Firefox backdoor,
a Nginx backdoor, and phishing emails. Detailed descriptions
of the attacks are available online [66].
Experimental Results. We partition each benign dataset into
a training set (90% of the graphs) and a test dataset (10% of
the graphs). We use the same sketch size (|S| = 2000) and
neighborhood hop (R = 3) as in the StreamSpot experiment.
Experiment Precision Recall Accuracy F-Score
DARPA CADETS 0.98 1.0 0.99 0.99
DARPA ClearScope 0.98 1.0 0.98 0.99
DARPA THEIA 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
TABLE V: Experimental results of the DARPA datasets.
Table V shows that UNICORN’s analytics framework gener-
alizes to different provenance capture systems and various
provenance graph structures. UNICORN’s high performance
suggests that it can accurately detect anomalies in long-running
systems of various platforms. During the engagement, the red
team launched APT attacks using different attack vectors and
the attacks account for less than 0.001% of the audit data
volume [87]. UNICORN’s anomaly-based detection mechanism
identifies those attacks without prior attack knowledge, even
though they are embedded in an abundance of benign activity.
We note that some existing systems (Holmes [87] and
Poirot [86]) also use the DARPA dataset for evaluation.
Comparison between UNICORN and these systems is diffi-
cult, because they use a rule-based approach that requires a
priori expert knowledge to construct a model. UNICORN is
fundamentally different, using an unsupervised learning model,
requiring no expert input. However, UNICORN’s performance
is comparable based on the number of detected attacks: UNI-
CORN detects all attacks on FreeBSD and Linux as do Holmes
and Poirot. We discuss the differences between these systems
and UNICORN in greater detail in § VIII.
C. Supply Chain Attack Scenarios
We designed two APT attack scenarios to run in a con-
trolled lab environment. These experiments evaluate the impor-
tance of graph analysis and evolutionary modeling (this section
and § VI-D) to show that UNICORN is able to perform efficient,
realtime monitoring (§ VI-E). Additionally, we use these ex-
periments to understand how UNICORN performs when faced
with attacks that behave similarly to normal system workloads.
We carefully design benign and attack scenarios to achieve
this goal. Previous experiments, conducted by others, do not
guarantee similarity between benign and attack scenarios.
Experiment Dataset # of Graphs Avg. |V| Avg. |E| Raw Data Size (GiB)
SC-1 Benign 125 265,424 975,226 64Attack 25 257,156 957,968 12
SC-2 Benign 125 238,338 911,153 59Attack 25 243,658 949,887 12
TABLE VI: Characteristics of the datasets used in the supply-chain APT attack
experiments.
Experimental Datasets. We simulated two APT supply-chain
attacks (SC-1 and SC-2) on a Continuous Integration (CI)
platform and used CamFlow (v0.5.0) to capture whole-system
provenance, including background activity, during both benign
and attack scenarios. For each scenario, the experiment ran
for three days. To facilitate reproduction, we leverage virtual-
ization technology as our test harness and provide automated
scripts for push-button replication of the experiments that
generated the data (see Appendix § A for details).
To simulate APT attacks, we follow the typical cyber kill
chain model that consists of roughly 7 nonexclusive phases,
i.e., reconnaissance (identify a target and explore its vulnera-
bilities), weaponize (design a backdoor and a penetration plan),
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Batch Size Sketch Size Hop Count Decay Factor Sketch Interval
Baseline 6,000 2,000 3 0.02 3,000
TABLE VII: UNICORN configurations for supply-chain APT attack scenarios.
delivery (deliver the weapon), exploitation (victim triggers the
vulnerability), installation (install the backdoor or malware),
command and control (C&C) (give remote instructions to the
victim), and actions on objectives [131].
In the SC-1 experiment, the attacker identified an enter-
prise CI server that routinely wgets Debian packages from
various repositories. She discovered that the server runs GNU
wget version 1.17, which is vulnerable to arbitrary remote
file upload when the victim requests a malicious URL to a
compromised server (CVE-2016-4971) [47] (reconnaissance).
The attacker embedded a common remote access trojan (RAT)
into a Debian package and compromised one of the repositories
so that any request to download the legitimate package is
redirected to the attacker’s FTP server that hosts the RAT-
embedded package (delivery). As the CI server downloaded
(exploitation) and installed (installation) the package, it also
unknowingly installed the trojan software. The RAT estab-
lished a C&C channel with the attacker, creating a reverse
TCP shell session on the CI server (C&C). The attacker then
modified the CI server configuration (actions on objectives) to
gain control of the CI deployment output. The SC-2 experiment
had a similar setup but the attacker exploited a different
vulnerability from GNU Bash version 4.3, which allows remote
attackers to execute arbitrary code via crafted trailing strings
after function definitions in Bash scripts (CVE-2014-6271).
Both scenarios represent the supply-chain compromise as the
initial access mechanism to subvert a company’s software
distribution channel to spread malware [48], [67].
In both experiments, we model normal behavior of the
victim system (i.e., the CI server). Table VI summaries the
datasets.
Experiment Precision Recall Accuracy F-Score
SC-1 0.85 0.96 0.90 0.90
SC-2 0.75 0.80 0.77 0.78
TABLE VIII: Experimental results of the supply-chain APT attack scenarios.
Experimental Results. We split 125 benign graphs randomly
into 5 groups to enable 5-fold cross validation. After we
use UNICORN to model normal behavior on the training set,
which consists of 100 benign graphs (i.e., 4 groups), we
evaluate it on the remaining 25 benign graphs (i.e., the 5th
group) for false positive validation. We also evaluate the model
on the 25 attack graphs for false negatives (Table VI). We
repeat this procedure for each group and report the mean
evaluation results. Table VII summarizes the configuration for
the experiments and Table VIII shows the experimental results.
We see in Table VIII that UNICORN is able to detect
attacks with high accuracy with only a small number of false
alarms (as reflected in precision and recall). We observe that
UNICORN creates many clusters in the sub-models during
modeling, and the majority of true alarms originate from the
first several clusters as UNICORN tracks system state transition.
This suggests that UNICORN’s evolutionary model captures
system behavior changes and that it is able to detect attacks
in their early stages, i.e., the initial supply-chain access point.
This has important implications. First, traditional clustering
approaches that use static snapshots to build the initial model
generate a large number of false positives (§ VI-A). These
can easily overwhelm system administrators and cause “threat
fatigue”, leading to alert dismissal. In supply-chain attacks,
the attackers can take advantage of this initial stage to break
into an enterprise network. UNICORN reduces false positives
as its evolutionary models precisely but flexibly define normal
system behavior. We further note that dynamically adapting the
model during runtime is also suboptimal in APT scenarios,
because once the attackers break into the network from the
initial supply chain, they can guide the model to slowly and
gradually penetrate the network without the model raising an
alarm. Second, while many APTs abandon stealth in later
attack stages, making detection easier, UNICORN raises alarms
in earlier stages, thus preventing damage that may have already
occurred when APTs unmask their behavior. For example, we
observe that 50% of the attacks in SC-1 were detected when
malicious packages were just delivered to the victim machine,
and all of them were flagged right after installation.
It is more difficult to detect attacks in the SC scenarios
than in the DARPA ones. The attackers in the DARPA datasets
spend time finding vulnerabilities in the system, and that
behavior appears in the traces. In contrast, in the SC scenarios,
the attacker has a priori knowledge of the target system (i.e.,
we act as both the attacker and the victim), so we can launch
an attack without any prior unusual behavior. This partially
explains UNICORN’s lower performance on the SC datasets.
In § VI-D, we conduct additional experiments on SC-1 to
demonstrate the importance of graph exploration in detecting
anomalies in provenance graphs.
D. Influence of Graph Analysis on Detection Performance
We now analyze the importance of UNICORN’s key pa-
rameters using the SC-1 dataset. We use the same setup
from § VI-C as our baseline configurations (Table VII). We
then vary parameters independently to examine the impact of
each. Fig. 3 shows the experimental results.
Batch Size (BS). This indicates the number of edges submitted
to GraphChi at once; it does not affect detection performance.
Hop Count (HC). This defines the size of the neighborhood
used to characterize each vertex; it is a measure of the
expressiveness of the features in our sketches. Larger hop
counts capture more contextual information, some of which
might be irrelevant, which can mask potential attacks [83],
[87], as shown in Fig. 3(a).
Sketch Size (SS). This is the size of our fixed-size histogram
representation. Larger SS allows UNICORN to include more
information about the evolving graph, thus reducing the error
of approximating normalized min-max similarity (§ IV-C).
However, a large SS ultimately leads to the curse of dimen-
sionality [38] in clustering (§ IV-D). Fig. 3(b) confirms that, in
general, detection precision, recall, and accuracy improve as
we increase SS up to a point, after which it degrades.
Interval of Sketch Generation (SG). This is the number of
edges added to the graph between the construction of new
sketches. Smaller SG makes adjacent sketches look similar
to each other, which can produce higher false negative rates
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Fig. 3: Detection performance (precision, recall, accuracy, and F-score) with varying hop counts (Fig. 3(a)), sketch sizes (Fig. 3(b)), intervals of sketch generation
(Fig. 3(c)), and decay factor (Fig. 3(d)). Baseline values (*) are used by the controlled parameters (that remain constant) in each figure.
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and lower recall and accuracy. Meanwhile, given fixed-size
sketches, which are approximations, a larger SG leads to
coarser-grained changes, which also makes graphs look too
similar to each other. In Fig. 3(c), we observe that SG = 500
edges per new sketch cannot detect any attack graphs, resulting
in 0 recall and undefined precision and F-score. We obtain
optimal results when setting the interval to be around 3, 000
in the SC-1 experiment.
Weighted Decay Factor (DF). This determines the rate at which
we forget the past. We observe that both never-forget (λ =
0.0) and always-forget (λ = 1.0) yield unsatisfactory results,
while a slow decay rate (around 0.02) achieves a good balance
between factoring past and current graph components into the
analysis.
E. Processing Speed
In the previous section, we show how UNICORN’s param-
eters influence detection performance; this section and the one
that follows examine UNICORN’s runtime overhead. These
sections consider only the CamFlow implementation, which
has been shown to produce negligible overhead [100], allowing
us to isolate UNICORN’s performance characteristics. We use
Amazon EC2 i3.2xlarge Linux machines with 8 vCPUs and
61GiB of memory.
Runtime performance is important in APT scenarios where
an IDS is constantly monitoring the system in real time. We
analyze the SC-1 experiment using the same baseline settings
and parameters as in the previous section. (We also evaluate
batch size here, which has no impact on accuracy.) Together,
these two sections illustrate the tradeoff between accuracy and
runtime performance.
Fig. 4 shows the total number of edges processed over
time as a metric to quantify UNICORN’s processing speed.
The CamFlow lines (in blue) represent the total number of
edges generated by the capture system; the closer other lines
are to this line, the better the runtime performance, meaning
that UNICORN “keeps up” with the capture system.
Batch Size (BS). Fig. 4(a) shows that runtime performance
improves as we increase BS. We use BS of 6,000 as it
approximates CamFlow. There is marginal improvement as we
increase BS above 6,000.
Sketch Size (SS). As shown in Fig. 4(b), SS has minimal impact
on runtime performance, except during the beginning of the
experiment when UNICORN initializes the sketch, which re-
quires more computation with larger sketch sizes. Afterwards,
runtime performance is similar among different SS, thanks to
UNICORN’s fast, incremental sketch update.
Hop Count (HC). Fig. 4(c) shows that HC has minimal impact
on provenance graphs because of the graph structure and its
adaption of fast WL algorithm.
Interval of Sketch Generation (SG) & Weighted Decay Factor
(DF). Neither SG nor DF affect runtime performance (we omit
DF from the figure).
Overall, we show that UNICORN runtime is relatively
insensitive to these parameters. This means that UNICORN can
perform realtime intrusion detection with parameters optimized
for detection accuracy.
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Fig. 4: Total number of processed edges over time (in seconds) in the SC-1 experimental workload with varying batch sizes (Fig. 4(a)), sketch sizes (Fig. 4(b)),
hop counts (Fig. 4(c)), and intervals of sketch generation (Fig. 4(d)). Dashed blue line represents the speed of graph edges streamed into UNICORN for analysis.
Triangle maroon baseline has the same configurations as those used in our experiments and indicates the values of the controlled parameters (that remain
constant) in each figure.
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F. CPU & Memory Utilization
We evaluate UNICORN’s CPU utilization and memory
overheads for a system under relatively heavy workload, i.e.,
CI performing kernel compilation. We show that UNICORN
exhibits low CPU utilization and memory overheads.
Fig. 5(a) shows the average CPU utilization due to UNI-
CORN over a long-running experiment using the baseline
configuration. The average CPU utilization stabilizes around
12.3% on a single CPU. Fig. 5(b) shows the per-vCPU and the
average CPU utilization of the same experiment (but with a
shorter timeline to avoid cluttering). Note that the parameters
discussed in the previous sections do not significantly impact
average CPU utilization.
PassMark Software’s Enterprise Endpoint Security perfor-
mance benchmark [14] shows an average CPU utilization of
26%-90% for commercial products such as Symantec End-
Configuration Parameter Parameter Value Max Memory Usage (MB)
Hop
Count
R = 1 562
R = 2 624
R = 3 687
R = 4 749
R = 5 812
Sketch
Size
|S| = 500 312
|S| = 1,000 437
|S| = 2,000 687
|S| = 5,000 1,374
|S| = 10,000 2,498
TABLE IX: Memory overheads with varying hop counts and sketch sizes. The
highlighted configurations gave the best detection performance.
point Protection, Kaspersky Endpoint Security, and McAfee
Endpoint Security. However, direct comparison is difficult.
Research IDS we surveyed (§ VIII) do not report metrics
that allow meaningful comparison. We leave the design of
meaningful performance benchmarks for IDS to future work.
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Table IX shows memory overheads for the same workload
under two different parameters. Other parameters in the basic
configurations do not significantly influence memory consump-
tion.
The graph histogram and the random variables sampled
for sketch generation represent the majority of UNICORN’s
memory usage. The size of the histogram is proportional to the
number of unique labels, which in turn is determined by the
size of the neighborhood that each vertex explores. Table IX
shows that as we increase the number of neighborhood hops,
UNICORN requires more memory for the histogram. In theory,
the total number of unique labels is bounded by the number of
possible combinations of node/edge types within |R| hops. In
practice, however, many parts of a provenance graph exhibit
similar structures and therefore the value is significantly lower
than the theoretical upper bound. For example, the maximum
memory usage of the experiment corresponding to Fig. 5(a)
remains around 680MB, which is acceptable for modern sys-
tems. As we increase the sketch size, UNICORN consumes
more memory to store additional random variables sampled
for sketch generation and update. Although with |S| = 10, 000,
memory consumption increases up to 2.5GiB (Table IX), the
previous sections suggest that such large values are never a
good option.
VII. DISCUSSION & LIMITATIONS
Anomaly-based Detection. UNICORN shares assumptions,
architecture, and therefore limitations with other anomaly-
based intrusion detection systems.
First, we assume there is a modeling period where system
administrators can run their systems safely to capture system
behavior (§ III). Second, we assume that there exists an
exhaustive, finite number of system behavior patterns and
most, if not all, patterns are observed during modeling [109].
UNICORN will raise a false alarm if it observes a new behavior
that is, in fact, normal; such alarms will require human-in-the-
loop intervention.
Adversaries may try to steer malicious behavior towards
learned models to evade detection, similar to the well-known
mimicry attacks [98]. However, conducting mimicry attacks
on provenance graphs and/or UNICORN’s graph sketches is
more challenging than on sequences of system calls, because
provenance graphs contain complex structural information that
is difficult to imitate without affecting the attack. Additionally,
UNICORN’s consistent weighted sampling approach random-
izes sketch generation, making it hard to guarantee that the
low-dimensional projections of mimicry provenance graphs
will be close to learned normal clusters. At the same time, this
complexity will make it difficult to use models to identify the
cause of an alarm. Fortunately, there exist tools that facilitate
attack causality analysis on provenance graphs (§ VIII).
UNICORN, like other anomaly-based systems, requires
sufficient benign behavior traces to learn behavior models.
Our current modeling design and implementation assumes that
UNICORN monitors a system from the same starting point as
its model, tracking state transitions as the system executes.
It can easily perform such continuous monitoring given its
high performance and scalability (§ VI). However, UNICORN
may raise false alarms if the current state does not match the
Fig. 5: Evaluation of UNICORN’s CPU utilization.
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modeled state as a result of, e.g., the system restoring to a
saved state due to failure. One approach to addressing this issue
is to integrate UNICORN more closely with the system so that
it can save its model state at the same time the system creates
snapshots; when the system restores a snapshot, UNICORN
would restore the corresponding model state.
False Alarms. As briefly mentioned above, when normal
system behavior changes, UNICORN might raise false positive
alarms, since it does not dynamically adjust its model (to avoid
attacker poisoning). The false alert problem is not unique to
UNICORN. In fact, it is a major concern even for signature-
based approaches used in practice, although in theory, these
approaches are designed to generate few such alarms due to
rigid attack matching [2]. UNICORN partially mitigates this
issue using concept drift (§ IV-B), modeling system evolution.
As we demonstrated in § VI, UNICORN improves precision
by 24% compared to the state-of-the-art and achieves near
perfect results on the DARPA datasets. However, UNICORN
must also ensure stability to avoid adversarial manipulation,
which inevitably increases the potential for false alerts. There-
fore, system administrators might need to periodically retrain
12
UNICORN’s model to stay up-to-date. Fortunately, updating
UNICORN models is quick; the important caveat is to ensure
that new training data is known to be devoid of malicious
activity.
Graph Analysis. UNICORN enables efficient and powerful
graph analysis, but similar to many IDS [8], [23], [83], [87], it
also requires parameters that must be tuned to each system
to improve detection performance (§ VI-D). Finding ideal
parameters for a specific task is a well-known research topic
in machine learning [119]. We used OpenTuner [11] to enable
program autotuning. Although our tests are by no means
exhaustive, it is encouraging that we were able to use the
same settings on almost all of our evaluation datasets, even
though they came from disparate sources and modeled rather
different attacks. Due to time and space constraints, we leave
the discussion of automatically tuning UNICORN to future
work.
Heterogenous Host Activity. In testing, we observed that
UNICORN performed extremely well in domains featuring
homogenous normal activities. For example, we achieve near-
perfect detection rates for the StreamSpot dataset (Table I).
This makes UNICORN a promising security tool in datacenters
and other production environments that perform well-defined
tasks, which are frequently the target of attacks [22], [74],
[106]. Hosts that exhibit more diverse behaviors, such as
workstations [18], pose a greater challenge for IDS in general.
Modern provenance capture systems (e.g., CamFlow) help
mitigate this issue as they can separate provenance data based
on, e.g., namespaces and control groups [100]. However, we
acknowledge that endpoint security for workstations presents
extra challenges that UNICORN does not attempt to address in
this work, as it was originally designed to protect more stable
environments.
Larger Cross-evaluation. We emphasize that comparing UNI-
CORN with other existing IDS (most of which are syscall-
based) is difficult for several reasons: A) many IDS are
not open-source; B) existing public IDS datasets are either
outdated [4], [85] or require a translation [28], [50], [51] from,
e.g., syscall traces to data provenance, which is challenging
and sometimes impossible (due to lack of information); C)
systems that create their own private datasets only superficially
describe their experimental procedures, making it difficult to
fairly reproduce the experiments for provenance data. We
believe that such a meta-study is a worthwhile endeavor that
we plan to pursue in future work.
VIII. RELATED WORK
This work lies at the intersection of dynamic host-
based intrusion detection, graph-based anomaly detection, and
provenance-based security analysis. Therefore, we place UNI-
CORN in the context of prior work in these areas.
Dynamic Host-based Intrusion Detection. Dynamic host-
based intrusion detection (HID) was pioneered by Forrest et
al.’s anomaly detection system [37] that used fixed-length
sequences of syscalls to define normal behavior for UNIX
processes. Debar et al. [29] and Wespi et al. [127] later gen-
eralized the approach to incorporate variable-length patterns.
As attacks became increasingly sophisticated [117], [123],
systems that modeled only syscall sequences suffered from
low detection accuracy. Next generation systems added state
to provide contextual information to the syscalls. Sekar et
al. [109] designed a finite-state automaton (FSA) that modeled
each state as the invocation of a system call from a particular
call site. VtPath [36] extended this idea to avoid the impossible
path problem, in which there may exist sequences of state
transitions in the FSA that cannot happen in practice. VtPath
performed more extensive call stack analysis to identify such
impossible paths as anomalies. Jafarian et al. [62] addressed
the impossible path problem by using a deterministic push-
down automata (DPDA). Maggi et al. [81] extended these
approaches by combining models of system call sequences
with models for the parameters to those system calls. As
automaton-based models approach their theoretical accuracy
limit, which is equivalent to a linear bounded automaton
(LBA) or a context-sensitive language model, their detection
capacity increases; however, the non-polynomial complexity
of such theoretical models makes it impossible to realize in
practice [113]. Even a constrained DPDA model exhibits a
polynomial time complexity [62]. Shu et al. [113] presented a
formal framework that surveyed host-based anomaly detection,
discussing in detail various dynamic and static approaches
orthogonal to our work. Liu et al. [78] summarized the state-
of-the-art host-based IDS [26], [68], [91] and discussed future
research trends, indicating data as one of the decisive factors
in IDS research.
UNICORN takes a completely different approach, because
traditional system call approaches are not well-suited for
APT attacks ( § II-A) [61], [125]. Our graph representation
and analysis avoids costly control-flow construction and state
transition automata, while accurately describing and model-
ing complex relationships among data objects in the system
for contextualized anomaly detection. To the best of our
knowledge, although some systems produce provenance-like
graphs from audit logs [83], UNICORN is the first system to
detect intrusions via runtime analysis of native whole-system
provenance.
Graph-based Anomaly Detection. Akoglu et al. determine
graph or subgraph similarity for anomaly detection by catego-
rizing graphs based on their properties (i.e., static vs. dynamic,
plain vs. attributed) [8].
Ding et al. [30] identified malicious network sources in
network flow traffic graphs based on cut-vertices, using simi-
larity metrics such as betweenness to detect cross-community
communication behavior. Liu et al. [77] constructed a software
behavior graph to describe program execution and used a
support vector machine (SVM) to classify non-crashing bugs
(e.g., logic errors that do not crash the program) based on
closed subgraphs and frequent subgraphs. These systems and
many other graph mining algorithms [39], [103] and graph
similarity measures (e.g., graph kernels [122]) are designed
only for static graphs and are difficult to adapt to a streaming
setting.
Papadimitriou et al. [97] proposed five similarity schemes
for dynamic web graphs, and NetSimile [17] used moments of
distribution to aggregate egonet-based features (e.g., number of
neighbors) to cluster social networks. Aggarwal et al. [6] used
a structural connectivity model to define outliers and design a
reservoir sampling approach that robustly maintains structural
summaries of homogeneous graph streams. However, these and
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other streaming-oriented approaches [49], [88], [115] are either
domain specific (e.g., bibliographic networks have a different
structure than provenance graphs) or applicable primarily to
homogeneous graphs.
In the realm of malware classification and intrusion detec-
tion, Classy [72] clusters streams of call graphs to facilitate
malware analysis based on graph edit distance (GED) [41]
of pairs of graphs using a modified version of simulated
annealing. Although its runtime complexity is suitable for
graph streams, the empirical evaluation was limited to graphs
with no more than 3,000 vertices; real system execution yields
graphs orders of magnitude larger [101].
StreamSpot [83] analyzes streaming information flow
graphs to detect anomalous activity. However, StreamSpot’s
graph features are locally constrained while UNICORN’s em-
body execution context. We show in § VI that contextualized
graph analysis has great impact on detection performance.
Furthermore, StreamSpot models only a single snapshot of
every training graph, dynamically maintaining its clusters
during test time. However, it results in a significant number
of false alarms, which creates an opportune time window for
the attacker. We also consider such an approach inappropriate
in APT scenarios, where persistent attackers can manipulate
the model to gradually and slowly change system behavior to
avoid detection. UNICORN takes full advantage of its ability
to continuously summarize the evolving graph, modeling the
corresponding evolution of the system execution it monitors.
FRAPpuccino [53] is another attempt at graph-based intrusion
detection. It uses a windowing approach to allow for efficient
graph analysis. Naturally, segmenting provenance graphs in
this way produces a more limited view of system execution,
unsuitable for long-term detection that spans windows.
Provenance-based Security Analysis A variety of security-
related applications leverage provenance, mostly notably for
forensic analysis and attack attribution [8]. BackTracker [69]
analyzes intrusions using a provenance graph to identify the
entry point of the intrusion, while PriorTracker [79] optimizes
this process and enables a forward tracking capability for
timely attack causality analysis. HERCULE [102] analyzes
intrusions by discovering attack communities embedded within
provenance graphs. Winnower [56] expedites system intrusion
investigation through grammatical inference over provenance
graphs, and simultaneously reduces storage and network over-
head without compromising the quality of provenance data.
NoDoze [55] performs attack triage within provenance graphs
to identify anomalous paths. Bates et al. [16] were the first to
use provenance for data loss prevention, and Park et al. [99]
formalized the notion of provenance-based access control
(PBAC). Ma et al. [80] designed a lightweight provenance
tracing system ProTracer to mitigate the dependence explosion
problem and reduce space and runtime overhead, facilitating
practical provenance-based attack investigation. Pasquier et
al. [101] introduced a generic framework, called CamQuery,
that enables inline, realtime provenance analysis, demonstrat-
ing great potential for future provenance-based security appli-
cations.
Recently, as APT attacks become increasingly prominent,
a number of systems leverage data provenance for APT attack
analysis. Holmes [87] and Sleuth [58] focus primarily on attack
reconstruction using information flow provided by data prove-
nance. Their approach is similar to an architecture proposed
by Tariq et al. [118] that correlates anomalous activity in grid
applications using data provenance. The anomaly detection
module itself uses a simple, pre-defined model that relies on
expert knowledge of the existing APT kill-chain to match
an a priori specification of possible exploits to localized
components in the graph. Poirot [86] produces another form of
attack reconstruction. It correlates a collection of compromise
indicators (found by other systems) to identify APTs. Relying
on expert knowledge from existing cyber threat intelligence
reports and compromise descriptions to construct attack query
graphs, Poirot performs offline graph pattern matching on
provenance graphs to uncover potential APTs. For example, it
uses the red team’s attack descriptions to manually craft query
graphs to correlate anomalies in the DARPA datasets used in
§ VI-B. This is a critical limitation given that composing a
sufficiently detailed description of a new class of APT takes
significant forensic effort [15].
UNICORN differs from these rule-based systems in that
it is an anomaly-based system that requires no prior expert
knowledge of APT attack patterns and behaviors. Although
rule-based approaches are closely aligned with commercial
practices today (i.e., they are essentially provenance-based
versions of the Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) tools
offered by enterprise security vendors), prior research shows
that rule-based EDR systems are the chief contributor to the
“threat fatigue problem” [2]. Recent work on provenance
analysis (e.g., NoDoze [55]) demonstrated that historical con-
text is crucial for mitigating this problem; UNICORN instead
investigates how to incorporate context as a first class citizen
in HID systems, rather than as a secondary triage tool.
Gao et al. [40] leveraged complex event processing plat-
forms and designed a domain-specific query language, SAQL
to analyze large-scale, streaming provenance data. The system
combines various anomaly models (e.g., rule-based anomalies)
and aggregates data streams across multiple hosts, but it
ultimately requires expert domain knowledge to identify ele-
ments/patterns to match against queries. We also note that our
provenance graph analyses are able to incorporate implicitly
(without domain knowledge) most of their anomaly models
(e.g., invariant-based, time-series, and outlier-based). Barre et
al. [15] mine data provenance to detect anomalies. The goal
of their work is mainly to identify important process features
that are likely to be relevant to APT attacks (e.g., a process’
lifetime and path information). Using a random forest model
with hand-picked process features, their system delivers a
detection rate of only around 50%. Such low performance
suggests that simple feature engineering on provenance graphs
without considering graph topology is insufficient in detecting
stealthy APT attacks. Berrada et al. [19] proposes score ag-
gregation techniques to combine anomaly scores from different
anomaly detectors to improve detection performance. Although
their work targets provenance graphs for APT detection, it
is orthogonal to UNICORN (or any other detectors) in that it
functions only as an aggregator for existing anomaly detection
systems.
IX. CONCLUSION
We present UNICORN, a realtime anomaly detection sys-
tem that leverages whole-system data provenance to detect
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advanced persistent threats that are deemed difficult for tra-
ditional detection systems. UNICORN models system behavior
via structured provenance graphs that expose causality relation-
ships between system objects, taking into account the entirety
of the graph by efficiently summarizing it as it streams into its
analytic pipeline. Our evaluation shows that the resulting evo-
lutionary models can successfully detect various APT attacks
captured from different audit systems, including real-life APT
campaigns, with high accuracy and low false alarm rates.
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APPENDIX
A. Availability
The implementation described in § V and the material to reproduce the
evaluation presented in § VI are available online under Apache License
V2.0 and GPL v2 (see individual subcomponents for more details) at https:
//github.com/crimson-unicorn.
B. HistoSketch
Notation and Basic Concepts. Table X presents the notation we use in the
rest of this section. Similarity-preserving data sketching, or locality sensitive
hashing (LSH), allows us to efficiently compute the similarity between two
graphs by projecting their high-dimensional histogram representations to a
low-dimensional space while preserving their similarity [83].
 , Set of histogram elements
h , Histogram element: h ∈ 
L , Cumulative, weighted histogram count vector: L ∈ R||>0
Lh , Count of histogram element h
λ , Weight decay factor
wt , Exponential decay weight: wt = e−λ∆t
S , Sketch of histogram vector L: |S|  || and is fixed
TABLE X: Notation
Formally, we define LSH as follows (adopted from Charikar [25]):
Definition 1: A locality sensitive hashing scheme is a distribution on
a family F of hash functions operating on a collection of objects, such
that for two objects m, n,
Ph∈F [h(m) = h(n)] = sim(m,n)
where sim(m,n) is some similarity function defined on the collection
of objects.
HistoSketch [132] uses normalized min-max similarity to measure the
similarity between two histogram vectors:
Definition 2:
simmin−max(H
a
, H
b
) =
∑
h∈min(H
a
h , H
b
h)∑
h∈max(H
a
h , H
b
h)∑
h∈
H
a
h = 1∑
h∈
H
b
h = 1
where the superscript a, b denotes the identity of a histogram.
Sketch Creation. HistoSketch uses a variation of consistent weighted
sampling that takes as input positive real numbers to generate fixed-size
sketches [76]. The size of the sketch |S| controls the tradeoffs between
information loss and computation efficiency for real-time detection (§ VI).
To generate one sketch element Sj , we first draw three random variables
for each h ∈ :
rh,j ∼ Gamma(2, 1)
ch,j ∼ Gamma(2, 1)
βh,j ∼ Uniform(0, 1)
and then follow the steps in Alg. 3. r, c, and β are fixed for each element
Algorithm 3: Creating Graph Sketch Using HistoSketch
Input : Histogram L, r, c, β
Output: Sketch S and the corresponding hash values A
1 for j ← 1 to |S| do
2 foreach h ∈  do
3 yh,j = exp(logLh − rh,jβh,j)
4 ah,j =
ch,j
yh,jexp(rh,j)
5 Sj = argminh∈ah,j
6 Aj = minh∈ah,j
in . The sketch element j is the element h in  whose hashed value ah,j is
the minimum in the jth column of matrix A.
Sketch Update. HistoSketch makes it possible to quickly update the sketch
as new data arrives. At time t + 1, it incrementally updates the sketch
S(t + 1) based on the weighted histogram L, the previous sketch S(t) and
its corresponding hash values A(t), the new data item xt+1, and the weight
decay factor λ. Alg. 4 describes this process in detail.
Algorithm 4: Updating Graph Sketch
Input : L, S(t), A(t), xt+1, λ
Output: New sketch S(t+ 1) and the corresponding hash values A(t+ 1)
1 foreach h ∈  do
2 Lh = Lh(t) · e−λ
3 /* exponential decay */
4 for j ← 1 to |S| do
5 if xt+1 ∈  then Lxt+1 = Lxt+1 + 1
6 else
7  = + {xt+1}
8 Lxt+1 = 1
9 Compute axt+1,j
10 /* see Alg. 3 */
11 if axt+1,j < Aj(t) · e−λ then
12 Sj(t+ 1) = xt+1
13 Aj(t+ 1) = axt+1,j
14 else
15 Sj(t+ 1) = Sj(t)
16 Aj(t+ 1) = Aj(t) · e−λ
C. Metrics
We denote false positives by fp, false negatives fn, true positives tp,
and true negatives tn.
Definition 3: precision = tp
tp+fp
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Definition 4: recall = tp
tp+fn
Precision and recall measure relevance in classification, where precision is a
measure of exactness and recall completeness.
Definition 5: accuracy = tp+tn
tp+tn+fp+fn
Definition 6: F-score = 2× precision×recall
precision+recall
F-score combines precision and recall using their harmonic mean. In our
measurement, recall and precision are evenly weighted.
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